This paper studies partnerships that employ a mediator to improve their contractual ability. Intuitively, profitable deviations must be attributable, i.e., there must be some group behavior such that an individual can be statistically identified as innocent, to provide incentives in partnerships. Mediated partnerships add value by effectively using different behavior to attribute different deviations. As a result, mediated partnerships are necessary to provide the right incentives in a wide range of economic environments.
Introduction
Providing incentives in partnerships is a classic topic of economic theory.
1 Although it is well-known that communication is a basic facet of incentive provision (Aumann, 1974; Forges, 1986; Myerson, 1986) , this insight has not been systematically applied to partnership problems. This paper adds to the literature by asking the following question. Consider a group of individuals whose behavior is subject to moral hazard, but with rich communication and contractual protocols: (i) a disinterested mediator that can make confidential, verifiable but non-binding recommendations to agents, and (ii) budget-balanced payment schemes 2 that may depend on both the mediator's recommendations and individual reports. What outcomes can this group enforce?
Our main result (Theorem 1) shows that identifying obedient agents (IOA) is both necessary and sufficient for every outcome to be virtually enforceable 3 in this mediated environment, regardless of preferences. IOA means that for any profile of deviations, there is some behavior by the agents that statistically identifies an innocent individual after any unilateral deviation in the profile. IOA enjoys the following crucial property: different behavior may be used to attribute innocence after different deviations.
Let us intuitively explain this result. On the one hand, providing incentives with budget balance requires punishing some agents and rewarding others simultaneously.
If after a unilateral deviation an innocent party cannot be identified then the deviator could have been anyone, so the only way to discourage the deviation is to punish everyone. However, this violates budget balance. On the other hand, IOA implies that budget-balanced incentives can be provided by rewarding the innocent and punishing all others. To prove this, we establish and take advantage of the following observation. Rich contractual protocols enable the use of payments that differ after different recommended actions. We show that effectively, in order to reward the innocent after a given deviation profile, different behavior may be used to find such innocent parties.
But this is just the definition of IOA. Without rich contractual protocols, the same payments must be made after every recommendation, and we show that as a result the same behavior must be used to identify the innocent.
1 See Alchian and Demsetz (1972) , Holmström (1982) , Radner et al. (1986) , Legros and Matsushima (1991) , Legros and Matthews (1993) , d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1998) and others.
2 Budget balance means that the sum of payments across individuals always equals zero. 3 An outcome is "virtually enforceable" if there is an enforceable outcome arbitrarily close to it.
Example
We begin our analysis of mediated partnerships with an example to capture the intuition behind our main result, Theorem 1. The example suggests the following intuitive way of attaining a "nearly efficient" partnership: appoint a secret principal.
Example 1. Consider a fixed group of n individuals. Each agent i can either work (a i = 1) or shirk (a i = 0). Let c > 0 be each individual's cost of effort. Effort is not observable. Output is publicly verifiable and can be either good (g) or bad (b). The probability of g equals P ( i a i ), where P is a strictly increasing function of the sum of efforts. Finally, assume that each individual i's utility function equals z i − ca i , where z i is the amount of money received by i. Radner et al. (1986) introduced this partnership in the context of repeated games.
They considered the problem of providing incentives for everyone to work-if not all the time at least most of the time-without needing to inject or withdraw resources from the group as a whole. They effectively showed that in this environment there do not exist output-contingent rewards that both (i) balance the group's budget, i.e., the sum of individual payments always equals zero, and (ii) induce everyone to work most of the time, let alone all of the time. Indeed, for everyone to work at all they must be rewarded when output is good. However, this arrangement violates budget balance, since everyone being rewarded when output is good clearly implies that the sum of payments across agents is greater when output is good than when it is bad.
An arrangement that still does not solve the partnership problem but nevertheless induces most people to work is appointing an agent to play the role of Holmström's principal. Call this agent 1 and define output-contingent payments to individuals as follows. For i = 2, . . . , n, let ζ i (g) = z and ζ i (b) = 0 be agent i's output-contingent money payment, for some z ≥ 0. To satisfy budget balance, agent 1's transfer equals
By construction, the budget is balanced. It is easy to see that everyone but agent 1 will work if z is sufficiently large. However, agent 1 has the incentive to shirk.
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With mediated contracts it is possible to induce everyone to work most of the time.
Indeed, consider the following incentive scheme. For any small ε > 0, a mediator or machine asks every individual to work (call this event 1) with probability 1 − ε. With probability ε/n, agent i is picked (assume everyone is picked with equal probability) and secretly asked to shirk, while all others are asked to work (call this event 1 −i ).
For i = 1, . . . , n, let ζ i (g|1) = ζ i (b|1) = 0 be agent i's contingent transfer if the mediator asked everyone to work. Otherwise, if agent i was secretly asked to shirk, for j = i let ζ j (g|1 −i ) = z and ζ j (b|1 −i ) = 0 be agent j's transfer. For agent i, let
By construction, this contract is budget-balanced. It is also incentive compatible.
Indeed, it is clear that asking an agent to shirk is always incentive compatible. If agent i is recommended to work, incentive compatibility requires that
which is satisfied if z is sufficiently large because P is strictly increasing. 10 Under this contract, everyone works with probability 1 − ε, for any ε > 0, by choosing z appropriately, so everyone working is approximated with budget balanced transfers.
The arrangement above solves the partnership problem of Radner et al. (1986) by occasionally appointing a secret principal. To induce everyone to work, this contract effectively appoints a different principal for different workers. Appointing the principals secretly allows for them to be used simultaneously. Finally, they are chosen only seldom to reduce the inherent loss from having a principal in the first place.
Example 1 reveals the logic behind our main result, Theorem 1. If a worker deviates (i.e., shirks) then he will decrease the probability of g not only when everyone else is asked to work, but also when a principal is appointed. In this latter case, innocence can be attributed to the principal, so the deviator can be punished by having every worker pay the principal. In other words, for each worker and any deviation by the worker there is a profile of actions by others such that his deviation can be statistically distinguished from someone else's (in this case, a principal, since the principal's deviation would raise the probability of g). This turns out to be not only necessary but also sufficient for solving any partnership problem.
10 Here, ε(n−1) n +(1−ε) is the probability that an agent is asked to work, and ε(n−1) n the probability that in addition someone else was appointed the secret principal.
Model
This section develops our model of mediated partnerships. It describes the environment, the timing of agents' interaction, notions of enforcement, and attribution.
Let I = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents, A i a finite set of actions available to any agent i ∈ I, and A = i A i the (nonempty) space of action profiles. Write v : I × A → R for the profile of agents' utility functions, where v i (a) denotes the utility to any agent i ∈ I from any action profile a ∈ A. A correlated strategy is any probability measure σ ∈ ∆(A).
11 Let S i be a finite set of private signals observable only by agent i ∈ I and S 0 a finite set of publicly verifiable signals. Let S := n j=0 S j be the (nonempty) space of all signal profiles. A monitoring technology is a measurevalued map Pr : A → ∆(S), where Pr(s|a) denotes the conditional probability that signal profile s was observed given that action profile a was played.
We model rich communication protocols by introducing a disinterested mediator that fulfills two roles: (i) making confidential recommendations to agents over what action to take and (ii) revealing the entire profile of recommendations publicly at the end of the game. This mediator may be seen as a proxy for any pre-play communication amongst the players (Aumann, 1987) .
Incentives are provided to agents with linear transfers. An incentive scheme is any map ζ : I × A × S → R that assigns monetary payments contingent on individuals, recommended actions, and reported signals, all of which are assumed verifiable. Definition 1. A contract is any pair (σ, ζ), where σ is a correlated strategy and ζ is an incentive scheme. It is called standard if ζ i (a, s) isn't a function of a, i.e., payments do not depend on recommendations. Otherwise, the contract is called mediated.
Standard contracts are a special case of mediated ones but not otherwise. For instance, the secret principal of Section 2 is a nonstandard mediated contract, since payments depend on recommendations. The literature has mostly focused on standard contracts to study incentives, whereas this paper concentrates on mediated ones.
It is important to emphasize that a standard contract does not do away with the mediator altogether-only as regards payments. Indeed, as will be seen below and 11 If X is a finite set, ∆(X) = {µ ∈ R X + : x µ(x) = 1} is the set of probability vectors on X.
was suggested in Example 1 above, we emphasize using the mediator not so much to correlate behavior, but rather to correlate payoffs in order to provide incentives.
The timing of agents' interaction unfolds as follows. Firstly, agents agree on some contract (σ, ζ). A profile of recommendations is drawn according to σ and made to agents confidentially by some mediator. Agents then simultaneously take some action, which is neither verifiable nor directly observable. Next, agents observe unverifiable private signals and submit a verifiable report of their observations before observing the public signal (the timing of signals is not essential, just simplifying). Finally, recommendation-and report-contingent transfers are made according to ζ.
Specifically, we assume that agents report their private signals simultaneously, and consider contracts where agents willingly behave honestly (report truthfully) and obediently (follow recommendations). In other words, strategic behavior is assumed to constitute a communication equilibrium, as in Myerson (1986) and Forges (1986) , of the game induced by a given contract (σ, ζ).
If every agent is honest and obedient, agent i's expected utility from (σ, ζ) is
Of course, agent i may disobey his recommendation a i to play some other action b i and lie about his privately observed signal. A reporting strategy is a map ρ i : S i → S i , where ρ i (s i ) is the reported signal when i privately observes s i . For instance, the truthful reporting strategy is the identity map τ i : S i → S i with τ i (s i ) = s i . Let R i be the set of all reporting strategies for agent i. For every agent i and every pair (b i , ρ i ) ∈ A i × R i , the conditional probability that s ∈ S will be reported when everyone else is honest and plays a −i ∈ A −i equals
A contract (σ, ζ) is incentive compatible if obeying recommendations and reporting honestly is optimal for every agent when everyone else is honest and obedient, i.e.,
12 We use the notation s = (s −i , s i ) for s i ∈ S i and s −i ∈ S −i = j =i S j ; similarly for a = (a −i , a i ). We end this section by defining a key condition called identifying obedient players, which will be shown to characterize enforcement. We begin with some preliminaries.
A strategy for any agent i is a map α i :
for the probability that i reacts by playing (b i , ρ i ) when recommended to play a i . For any σ and any α i , let Pr(σ, α i ) ∈ ∆(S), defined pointwise by
be the vector of report probabilities if agent i deviates from σ according to α i .
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Call α attributable if it is not unattributable, i.e., there exist agents i and j such that Pr(a, α i ) = Pr(a, α j ) for some a ∈ A.
Intuitively, a strategy profile α is unattributable if a unilateral deviation from honesty and obedience by any agent i to a strategy α i in the profile would lead to the same conditional distribution over reports. Heuristically, after a deviation (from honesty and obedience) belonging to some unattributable profile, even if the fact that someone deviated was detected, anyone could have been the culprit.
, it disobeys some recommendation with positive probability. A disobedient strategy may be "honest,"
i.e., ρ i may equal τ i . However, dishonesty by itself (obeying recommendations but
is not labeled as disobedience. A disobedient strategy profile is any α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) such that α i is disobedient for at least one agent i.
Definition 4. A monitoring technology identifies obedient agents (IOA) if every disobedient strategy profile is attributable.
IOA means that for every disobedience by some arbitrary agent i and every profile of others' strategies, an action profile exists such that i's unilateral deviation has a different effect on report probabilities from at least one other agent. For instance, the monitoring technology of Example 1 identifies obedient agents. There, if a worker shirks then good news becomes less likely, whereas if a principal works then good news becomes more likely. Hence, a strategy profile with i disobeying is attributable by just having another agent behave differently from i. This implies IOA. Intuitively, IOA holds by using different principals for different workers.
Results
This section presents the paper's main results, characterizing enforceable outcomes in terms of the monitoring technology, with and without mediated contracts. We begin with a key lemma that provides a dual characterization of IOA.
Lemma 1. A monitoring technology identifies obedient agents if and only if there exists a function ξ : I × A × S → R such that i ξ i (a, s) = 0 for every (a, s) and
with a strict inequality whenever a i = b i .
Intuitively, Lemma 1 shows that IOA is equivalent to the existence of budgetbalanced "probability-weighted" transfers ξ such that (i) the budget is balanced,
(ii) no deviation is profitable, and (iii) every disobedience incurs a strictly positive monetary cost. If every action profile is recommended with positive probability, i.e., if σ ∈ ∆ 0 (A) := {σ ∈ ∆(A) : σ(a) > 0 ∀a ∈ A} is any completely mixed correlated strategy, then there is an incentive scheme ζ with ξ i (a, s) = σ(a)ζ i (a, s) for all (i, a, s).
Therefore, IOA implies that given σ ∈ ∆ 0 (A) and ξ satisfying Lemma 1, for any profile v of agents' utility functions we may scale ζ appropriately to overcome all incentive constraints simultaneously. Hence, the second half of Lemma 1 implies that every completely mixed correlated strategy is exactly enforceable, regardless of the utility profile. Approximating each correlated strategy with completely mixed ones establishes half of our main result, Theorem 1 below. The other half argues that if IOA fails then there exists a profile of utility functions and a correlated strategy that is not virtually enforceable. In this sense, IOA is the weakest condition on a monitoring technology that-independently of preferences-guarantees virtual enforcement.
Theorem 1. A monitoring technology identifies obedient agents if and only if for any profile of utility functions, every correlated strategy is virtually enforceable.
Theorem 1 characterizes monitoring technologies such that "everything" is virtually enforceable, regardless of preferences. It says that identifying obedient agents in a weak sense is not only necessary but also sufficient for virtual enforcement. Intuitively, if after a disobedience some innocent agent can be statistically identified then that agent can be rewarded at the expense of everyone else, thereby punishing the deviator. Heuristically, if a strategy profile can be attributed then there is an incentive scheme that discourages every strategy in that profile. Theorem 1 says that for every disobedient strategy profile there is a scheme that discourages it if and only if there is a scheme that discourages all disobedient strategy profiles simultaneously.
To put Theorem 1 in perspective, consider the scope of enforcement with standard contracts. By Example 1, IOA is generally not enough for enforcement with standard contracts, but the following strengthening is. Given a subset B ⊂ A of action profiles and an agent i, let 16 By definition, supp σ = {a ∈ A : σ(a) > 0} is the support of σ. 17 Even for virtual enforcement with standard contracts the same σ must attribute all α's. E.g.,
in Example 1 there is no sequence {σ m } with σ m → 1 and Pr satisfying IOA-σ m for all m. 18 Again, we abuse notation by labeling a as both an action profile and a pure correlated strategy.
for its enforcement for all preferences. Moreover, any other correlated strategy with support contained in supp σ becomes virtually enforceable, just as with Theorem 1.
Intuitively, mediated contracts allow for different actions in the support of a correlated strategy to attribute different strategy profiles, unlike standard contracts, as shown above. Therefore, clearly IOA-σ is more restrictive than supp σ-IOA.
Although the results above focused on enforcement for all utility profiles, restricting attention to fixed preferences does not introduce additional complications and yields similar results. Indeed, fix a profile v : I × A → R of utility functions. A natural weakening of IOA involves allowing unprofitable strategy profiles to be unattributable.
A strategy profile α is called σ-profitable if
Intuitively, the profile α is σ-profitable if the sum of each agent's utility gains from a unilateral deviation in the profile is positive. Enforcement now amounts to the following. Theorem 4 characterizes enforceability with and without mediated contracts. It describes how mediated contracts add value by relaxing the burden of attribution:
Every profile α that is attributable at σ is supp σ-attributable, but not conversely.
For instance, in Example 1, let σ(S) be the probability that S ⊂ I are asked to work, and suppose that σ(I) > 0. Let α be the strategy profile where every agent i shirks with probability p i if asked to work (and obeys if asked to shirk), with
. By construction, the probability of good output equals σ(I)P (n − 1) + S =I σ(S)P (|S|), which is independent of i. Therefore, α is not attributable at any σ with σ(I) > 0. However, α is attributable, since the monitoring technology identifies obedient agents.
Discussion
In this section we decompose IOA to understand it better under the assumption of public monitoring and consider participation and liability constraints. Finally, we also establish conditions under which genericity of IOA is guaranteed.
Public Monitoring
To help understand IOA, let us temporarily restrict attention to publicly verifiable monitoring technologies, i.e., such that |S i | = 1 for all i = 0. In this case, IOA can be naturally decomposed into two parts. We formalize this decomposition next.
A strategy α i for any agent i is detectable if Pr(a, α i ) = Pr(a) at some a ∈ A. Say Pr detects unilateral disobedience (DUD) if every disobedient strategy is detectable,
19
where different action profiles may be used to detect different strategies. Say detection implies attribution (DIA) if for every detectable strategy α i and every strategy profile
Intuitively, DIA says that if a strategy is detected, someone can be (statistically) ruled out as innocent.
Theorem 5. A publicly verifiable monitoring technology identifies obedient agents if and only if (i) it detects unilateral disobedience and (ii) detection implies attribution.
An immediate example of DIA is Holmström's (1982) principal, i.e., an individual i 0 with no actions to take or signals to observe (both A i 0 and S i 0 are singletons). The principal is automatically obedient, so every detectable strategy can be discouraged with budget balance by rewarding him and punishing everyone else. DIA isolates this idea and finds when the principal's role can be fulfilled internally. It helps to provide budget-balanced incentives by identifying innocent individuals to be rewarded and punishing all others (if necessary) when a disobedience is detected.
Next, we give a dual characterization of DIA that sheds light into the role it plays in Theorem 1. A publicly verifiable monitoring technology Pr satisfies incentive compatibility implies enforcement (ICE) if for every K : A × S → R there exists
The function K(a, s) may be regarded as a budgetary surplus or deficit for each combination of recommended action and realized signal. Intuitively, ICE means that any budget can be attained by some payment scheme that avoids disrupting any incentive compatibility constraints. As it turns out, this is equivalent to DIA. 
The following is a profile of (trivially obedient) unattributable strategies that are also detectable, violating DIA. Suppose that agent i deviates by lying with probability 2/5 after observing s i = 1 and lying with probability 3/5 after observing s i = 0. For every agent i, the joint distribution of reported private signals becomes: 
Participation and Liability
Individual rationality-or participation-constraints are easily incorporated into the present study of incentives, by imposing the following family of inequalities:
Theorem 7. Participation is not a binding constraint if
Theorem 7 generalizes standard results (e.g., d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1998, Lemma 1) to our setting.
Next, we study limited liability given z ∈ R I + , by imposing constraints of the form ζ i (a, s) ≥ −z i . Intuitively, an agent can never pay any more than z i . Call z i agent i's liability, and z the distribution of liability. A group's total liability is defined by z = i z i . Without participation constraints, Theorem 5 of Legros and Matsushima (1991) and Theorem 4 of Legros and Matthews (1993) easily generalize to this setting.
Theorem 8. In the absence of participation constraints, only total liability affects the set of enforceable outcomes, not the distribution of liability.
Including participation constraints leads to the following characterization.
Theorem 9. The correlated strategy σ is enforceable with individual rationality and liability limited by z if and only if
for every (α, π) such that α is a strategy profile and π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) ≥ 0, where η := (a,s) min i {Pr(s|a, α i ) − (1 + π i ) Pr(s|a)} and v i (σ) = a σ(a)v i (a).
Theorem 9 generalizes Theorems 7 and 8, as the next result shows. Corollary 1. Suppose that σ is enforceable with individual rationality and liability limited by z. (i) If v i (σ) ≥ z i then agent i's participation is not a binding constraint.
(ii) The distribution of liability does not matter within the subset t of agents whose participation constraint is not binding, i.e., σ is also enforceable with individual rationality and liability limited by any z with z j = z j for j ∈ I \ t and i∈t z i = i∈t z i .
Genericity
Genericity of IOA is discussed next. To motivate, consider firstly a negative result.
Theorem 10. Identifying obedient agents is impossible with only two agents, at least two actions per agent and no public information.
Theorem 10 simply says that with two agents and no public signals it is always possible to blame the other agent for a deviation. Since it is impossible to identify who deviated, by elimination it is also impossible to identify who did not deviate.
Fortunately, IOA almost always holds beyond this environment. To show this, relabel the agents so that i < j if |S i | ≤ |S j |, and let k be the number of agents i with |S i | = 1, i.e., not sending reports. Without loss, assume i < j if |A i | ≤ |A j | for all i, j ≤ k.
Theorem 11. IOA is generic if for every agent i, (a)
where χ n = 1 if |S −n | = 1 and 0 otherwise, and agents are ordered as above.
Conditions (a,b,c) above imply that DUD is generic, and the last condition that DIA is generic. To explain Theorem 11, consider some examples. Firstly, if agent 1 is a principal, i.e., |A 1 | |S 1 | = 1, then IOA is generic if (a,b,c) hold, so DUD is generic. In contract theory, Legros and Matsushima (1991) characterize exact enforcement with standard contracts and publicly verifiable signals, but they do not interpret their results in terms of attribution, nor do they consider virtual enforcement. Another related paper is d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1998) . In the same context as Legros and Matsushima (1991) , they derive intuitive sufficient conditions for enforcement. A closer paper to ours is Legros and Matthews (1993) , who study virtual enforcement with standard contracts and deterministic output. They propose a contract that uses mixed strategies to identify non-shirkers whenever possible, 22 but the same correlated strategy must identify non-shirkers after every deviation, unlike mediated contracts.
Their contract fails to provide the right incentives if output given efforts is stochastic and its distribution does not have a "moving support," i.e., the support does not depend on efforts. The key difference between their contract and ours is that mediated partnerships correlate agents' payoffs not just to output, but also to others' mixed strategies. As a result, mediated partnerships can virtually enforce efficient behavior even without a moving support, as Example 1 and Theorem 1 show.
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In the context of repeated games, the closest papers to ours may be Kandori (2003) , Aoyagi (2005) 
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Although his contracts are nonstandard, they fail to fully employ communication.
For instance, they fail to provide incentives in Example 1. Aoyagi uses dynamic mediated strategies that rely on "ε-perfect" monitoring, and fail if monitoring is costly or one-sided. Our results accommodate these issues. Finally, Tomala studies a class of recursive communication equilibria.
There are several differences between these papers and ours. One especially noteworthy difference is that to prove the Folk Theorem they make much more restrictive assumptions than IOA, structurally similar to pairwise full rank (PFR) of Fudenberg et al. (1994) . Intuitively, PFR-like conditions ask to identify deviators instead of just non-deviators. To see this, let us focus for simplicity on public monitoring and recall the decomposition of IOA into DUD and DIA (Theorem 5).
For every i, let C i (called the cone of agent i) be the set of all η ∈ R A×S with
for some α i : A i → ∆(A i ). DIA imposes the following restriction on agents' cones:
23 Fudenberg et al. (1994) consider a form of virtual enforcement without a moving support.
However, they require much stronger assumptions than ours, discussed momentarily. 24 Obara (2008) extends Kandori's contracts to study full surplus extraction with moral hazard and adverse selection in the spirit of Cremer and McLean (1988) , ignoring budget balance.
where 0 stands for the origin of R A×S .
In other words, agents' cones do not overlap. PFR implies that for every pair of agents, their cones do not overlap. Intuitively, this means that upon any deviation it is possible to identify the deviator's identity. On the other hand, DIA only requires that all agents' cones fail to overlap simultaneously. Thus, it is possible to provide budget-balanced incentives even if there are two agents whose cones overlap (i.e., their intersection is larger than just the origin), so PFR fails. In general, DIA does not even require that there exist two agents whose cones fail to overlap, in contrast with local compatibility of d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1998) . Figure 1 below illustrates this point.
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Figure 1: A cross-section of three non-overlapping cones in R 3 (pointed at the origin behind the page) such that every pair of cones overlaps.
Conclusion
Mediated partnerships embrace the idea that-as part of an economic organizationit may be beneficial for private information to be allocated differently across agents to provide the right incentives. As Example 1 illustrates, mediated partnerships can enforce outcomes that standard ones simply cannot. Indeed, mediated contracts can provide the right incentives in partnerships with stochastic output whose distribution fails to exhibit a "moving support" (i.e., the support is independent of effort), even without complementarities in production. Standard contracts cannot.
In general, mediated partnerships are enforceable if and only if it is possible to identify obedient agents. This means that after any unilateral deviation, innocence is statistically attributable to someone, although different actions may be used to 25 Figure 1 is not pathological. Indeed, Example 1 may be viewed as a version of Figure 1 .
attribute innocence after different deviations. 26 Informationally, this is clearly less costly than attempting to attribute guilt, as well as using the same actions to attribute innocence after every deviation. This latter difference exactly captures the value of mediated partnerships.
A Proofs
Lemma 1. With only finitely many actions and finitely many agents, the second half of the lemma holds if and only if there exists ξ such that i ξ i (a, s) = 0 for all (a, s) and
where ∆ i (a i , b i ) = 1 if a i = b i and 0 otherwise. Consider the linear program consisting of choosing ξ to minimize 0 subject to the above constraints. The dual problem is to choose a vector (λ, η) such that λ ≥ 0 to
Here, the vector λ ≥ 0 collects the multipliers on incentive constraints and η those of the budget balance constraints. Since the dual is feasible (with (λ, η) = 0), by the Strong Duality Theorem (see, e.g., Schrijver, 1986, p. 92) , the condition on ξ above fails if and only if there exists a dual feasible solution (λ, η) such that
By construction, α i is disobedient and unattributable (using α −i ): IOA fails.
Theorem 1. Sufficiency follows from the paragraph preceding the statement of the theorem. For necessity, suppose that IOA fails, i.e., there is a disobedient profile α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) that is also unattributable. Let a * ∈ A be an action profile where α is disobedient, i.e., there exists an agent i * such that α i * (b i * , ρ i * |a * i * ) > 0 for some b i * = a * i * . Let v i (a) = 0 for all (i, a) except for v i * (b i * , a * −i * ) = 1. Consider any correlated strategy σ that places positive probability on a * . For a contradiction, assume that there is a payment scheme ζ that enforces σ. Summing the incentive constraints at a * across agents, and using budget balance together with the definition of v, we obtain
Therefore, σ is not enforceable. Finally, this implies that a * is not virtually enforceable.
Theorem 2. The proof below follows that of Lemma 1 above. By the Strong Duality Theorem, Pr satisfies IOA-σ if and only if there exists a payment scheme ζ : I × S → R that only depends on reported signals for each agent such that i ζ i (s) = 0 for all s and
with a strict inequality if a i = b i , where B i = {a i ∈ A i : ∃a −i s.t. σ(a) > 0}. Call this dual condition IOA * -σ. By scaling ζ as necessary, IOA * -σ clearly implies that any deviation gains can be outweighed by monetary losses. Conversely, if IOA-σ fails then there is a profile of deviation plans α such that Pr(σ, α i ) = Pr(σ, α j ) for all (i, j) and there is an agent i * such that α i * satisfies α i * (b i * , ρ i * |a i * ) > 0 for some a i * ∈ B i * , and
, being a nonnegative linear combination of incentive constraints, will violate at least one. Theorem 5. IOA clearly implies DUD (just replace α −i with honesty and obedience for every α i in the definition of attribution). By IOA, if a profile α is unattributable then it is obedient, hence every deviation plan in the profile is undetectable (since the monitoring technology is publicly verifiable), and DIA follows. Conversely, DIA implies that every unattributable α i is undetectable, and by DUD, every undetectable α i is obedient.
Theorem 6. Consider the following primal problem: Find a feasible ξ to solve
The dual of this problem is given by
If ICE is satisfied, then the value of the primal equals 0 for any K : A × S → R. By the Strong Duality Theorem, the value of the dual is also 0 for any K : A × S → R. Therefore, any η satisfying the constraint for some λ must be 0 for all (a, s), so DIA is satisfied.
For sufficiency, if DIA holds then the value of the dual is always 0 for any K : A × S → R. By strong duality, the value of the primal is also 0 for any K. Therefore, given K, there is a feasible primal solution ξ i (a, s) that satisfies all primal constraints, and ICE holds.
Theorem 7. We use the following notation. Given a correlated strategy σ and a deviation plan
) be the utility gain from α i at σ and ∆ Pr(s|a, (s|a)) the change in the probability that s is reported from α i at a. Enforcing an arbitrary correlated strategy σ subject to participation constraints reduces to finding transfers ζ to solve the following family of linear inequalities:
The dual of this problem subject to participation is: max λ,π≥0,η i∈I
where π i is a multiplier for agent i's participation constraint and
Adding the dual constraints with respect to s ∈ S, it follows that π i = π does not depend on i. Redefining η(a, s) as η(a, s)+π Pr(s|a), the set of feasible λ ≥ 0 is the same as without participation constraints. Since i v i (a) ≥ 0 for all a, the dual is maximized by π = 0.
Theorem 8. We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 7. Let z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) be a vector of liability limits for each agent. Enforcing σ subject to limited liability reduces to finding ζ such that
The dual of this metering problem subject to one-sided limited liability is given by:
where β i (a, s) is a multiplier on the liability constraint for agent i at (a, s). Adding the dual equations with respect to s implies − s β i (a, s) = s η(a, s) for all (i, a). Therefore,
where z = i z i , so we may eliminate β i (a, s) from the dual and get the equivalent problem:
Any two liability profiles z and z with z = z lead to this dual with the same value.
Theorem 9. We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 7. Enforcing σ subject to participation and liability is equivalent to the value of the following problem being zero:
The first family of constraints imposes incentive compatibility, the second budget balance, the third individual rationality, and the last corresponds to one-sided limited liability. The dual of this metering problem is given by the following program, where λ, η, π and β represent the respective multipliers on each of the primal constraints. max α,π,β≥0,η i∈I
Adding the dual constraints with respect to s ∈ S, it follows that
where η := (a,s) η(a, s). After substituting and eliminating β, the dual is equivalent to V := max α,π≥0,η i∈I
Now, σ is enforceable if and only if V = 0, i.e., if and only if for any dual-feasible (α, π, η) such that i ∆v i (σ, α i ) > 0, we have that
Finally, since the dual objective is increasing in η, an optimal solution for η must solve
This completes the proof.
Corollary 1. Given the dual problem from the proof of Theorem 9, the first statement follows because if v i (σ) ≥ z i then the objective function is decreasing in π i and reducing π i relaxes the dual constraints. The second statement follows by rewriting the objective as
where t is the set of agents whose participation constraint won't bind (π * i = 0 for i ∈ t).
Theorem 10. Fix an arbitrary action profile a ∈ A and consider the following disobedient deviation plan α i for every agent i: always play a i regardless of the mediator's recommendation a i and report s i with probability Pr( a 1 , a 2 ) if a 1 = a 1 and a 2 = a 2 Pr(s 1 |a 1 , a 2 ) Pr(s 2 | a)
if a 1 = a 1 and a 2 = a 2 Pr(s 1 |a 1 , a 2 ) Pr(s 2 | a 1 , a 2 ) if a 1 = a 1 and a 2 = a 2 These probabilities are the same regardless of who deviates, hence IOA fails.
Theorem 11. Given the ordering of agents in the main text, if k > 0 permute agent k with agent 1 and consider the following block matrix (blank spaces denote blocks of zeros).
where Q i is the matrix with (|A i | |S i |) 2 rows and |A| |S| columns defined pointwise by Therefore there are |A −1,i | − 1 redundant columns for each (a 1 , a i ). There are even more redundant column vectors when k > 1. Fix any (a 1 , a i ) ∈ A 1 ×A i for i ≤ k. Note that there exist a such that a 1 = a 1 and a i = a i for which no column has been deleted as redundant (indeed there exists only one such a due to the previous step). Denote such a by a(a 1 , a i ). Now, for any a 1 = a 1 ∈ A 1 , a i = a i ∈ A i , we have for a 1 = a 1 , a 1 and a i = a i , a i (all other rows are 0 and these equations are trivially satisfied).
Hence there are (|A 1 | − 1) (|A i | − 1) more redundant columns for (1, i). If |S −n | = 1 a similar argument shows that there are |A n | |S n | (|A n | − 1) additional redundant rows.
By construction, IOA holds if λQ = 0 implies that λ = 0. This holds generically if (1)Q has full row rank generically, i.e., it has no more rows than columns, so 
